04-29-2007, 09:20 AM
10 4.1 Modernisation - Central Government
Following publication of the Bain Review and despite its obvious flaws, Mr Prescott immediately welcomed the findings and pledged the Government to implement its recommendations as quickly as possible.
However, subsequent revelations by Channel 4 News on 20th December 2002, finally forced the Government to publish the findings of the Pathfinder Trials. Although ready to embrace the findings of the so-called 'independent' Bain Review without question, the ODPM said of their own sponsored research (Pathfinder), undertaken by experts over a period of years:
"Although the report was commissioned by this Office, the findings and recommendations are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister".
It would appear that the ODPM consider that the people who they themselves appointed to conduct the Pathfinder Trials were not sufficiently competent. Either that or, although Pathfinder was carried out by experts, they would prefer to base the future of the entire fire service upon the findings of a hastily convened committee of amateurs. Had the Review restricted itself to industrial relations and the pay dispute then Professor Bain would have been acting within his sphere of competence. However, this was not the case. The Review recommends far-reaching changes to proven, operational firefighting practice. These changes are not driven by technical imperative but to justify a reduction in the number of front¬line firefighters in order to effect a cost-neutral pay settlement.
One ODPM source tried to dismiss publication of Pathfinder as premature, even though it had lain dormant for more than two years. Mr Raynsford, the minister responsible for the fire service at the time, suggested that further analysis of Pathfinder carried out by the ODPM, showed that by using a different set of planning assumptions, the cost of the fire service could be cut by half without making much difference to current levels of loss of life and property. Such planning assumptions have not yet been made available to the public.
Employers and Government sources even tried to discredit Pathfinder (and justify their own plans to down-size the fire service) by repeating erroneous criticisms embedded in Bain.
"Pathfinder work was directed only to fire cover. The need is for an integrated risk-based policy including community fire safety and statutory fire safety measures". Bain Review 5.14
Such claims conflict with earlier, expert opinions.
11
"... (Pathfinder) considers how existing safety measures ( such as fire detection and protection systems, fire safety education and community fire safety measures ) will drive risk down." George Almond Jamooo
"The new methodology provides a national basis for planning the provision of Fire Service Emergency Cover....it provides... a cornerstone of an integrated approach to fire risk management....an evidence based method for assessing and responding to actual risk, taking into account the effect of fire safety measures." The Report of the CFBAC Fire Cover Review Task Group
It should also be considered that the FSEC methodology which followed on from Pathfinder and is now used to develop IRMP's cannot, of itself anticipate the outcomes of CFS. If that was a criticism of Pathfinder then it must equally apply to the current FSEC.
Pathfinder was an embarrassment to the Government.. In order to divert attention, the Government tried to portray the fire service as an incorrigibly backward institution, steeped in old ways of working and restrictive practices. What ministers failed to explain was how such an allegedly inflexible organization could be repeatedly identified as the top performing public service by the Audit Commission.
The Government kept the public debate simplistic, resorting to phrases such as 'modernisation' and 'people not buildings'.People were not encouraged to look too closely at what changes were to be involved in this process.
There was to be no major effort to sell the concept of risk-based fire cover. What the public was sold was an image of greedy and lazy firefighters betraying British troops at a time of impending hostilities in Iraq. What they were not asked was if they would be prepared to see their local fire station closed in order that the service to other people could be improved. What they were not asked was if they would feel safer if fewer firefighters were to attend if their house caught fire and would they mind if they took a little longer to arrive. These issues are fundamental to the Governments vision of a 'modern' fire service.
Perhaps the Government still considered the time to be premature' for public education. Certainly the Government implemented its 'reforms' without any meaningful public debate. Local fire authorities and senior fire officers were carried along by promises that they would be given the power to really manage and adapt their resources to suit their local needs.
4.2 Modernisation - Local Authorities
As a consequence of the firefighters dispute the Government were able to pave the way for their vision of a 'modern fire service' by repealing long-standing legislation which had prescribed national standards for emergency fire cover. Brigades were free to determine for themselves what speed of respon
12
weight of attack should apply within their own area. Yet, at the same time, the Government had stripped HM Fire Service Inspectorate of its role to carry out annual inspections of such standards at a time when it would have seemed reasonable, indeed prudent, to retain that role, if only for a transitional period..
The Government had also removed the need for fire authorities to seek ministerial approval for the impending changes. Under this new regime, each fire authority would produce an annual Integrated Risk Management Plan (IRMP) which would out-line proposed changes proposed for the coming year. It was to be the duty of each fire authority to consult the public and various stakeholders about such proposals. In the absence of nationally prescribed standards, this consultation process must be seen as fundamental in establishing a locally determined fire service. Yet many authorities have not promoted or pursued this process as vigorously as they have publicized other aspects of the modern fire service.
The general public know little of what is involved in the modernization program and few are aware of the consultation process. Many brigades seem happy to accept this situation and attribute it to apathy on the part of the general public.. IRMP's seem to be produced as a dialogue between professionals rather than to inform the layman.
(Some IRMP's) "read like internal documents with a section added about consultation. In no way can such plans encourage real and effective consultation with stakeholders" Peter Brierley Fire Engineers Journal Feb 2005
The extent to which some brigades have failed to engage in any robust consultation process was illustrated by one councilor's comments on resigning from the Tayside Fire Board in March 2005:
"7 con no longer serve on a board that does not wish to have the opinions of the
general public in Tayside."
Councillor Jennifer Speirs Lib Dem Arbroath
Councilor Speirs felt that there had not been sufficient public consultation over the proposed IRMP. It was revealed that less than a quarter of the planned 180.000 leaflets had been delivered to the public, and that there had been only 86 responses. Firemaster Stephen Hunter thought that approximately 40,000 leaflets had been delivered but he did not know to which areas. Even so, it was not considered to defer adoption of the IRMP to allow time to complete the consultation process.
When consultation does take place there is no guarantee that a fire authority will take account of public opinion. In 2004 Wiltshire Fire Brigade carried out a web-
13 based survey in which they asked:
Last year, 40% of the calls attended by Wiltshire Fire Brigade were unwanted or false alarm calls from, automatic fire alarm systems and telephone calls from the public. Do you that the Fire Brigade should always respond immediately to these calls?
Over 90% replied, "Yes, always respond immediately'.
In some circumstances, before sending firefighters to the scene, the Fire Brigade could ask people ivho report an automatic fire alarm sounding to check whether there is a fire in the building. Hoiv reasonable or unreasonable do you think this proposal would be?
Over 72% replied, "Very or fairly unreasonable'.
Yet in September 2004, Wiltshire Fire Brigade issued a statement that they were
tO adopt a "policy ofnon attendance in respect to fire signals generated from automatic fire detection systems unless there is a confirmed fire" (except in Certain
circumstances).
Following publication of the Bain Review and despite its obvious flaws, Mr Prescott immediately welcomed the findings and pledged the Government to implement its recommendations as quickly as possible.
However, subsequent revelations by Channel 4 News on 20th December 2002, finally forced the Government to publish the findings of the Pathfinder Trials. Although ready to embrace the findings of the so-called 'independent' Bain Review without question, the ODPM said of their own sponsored research (Pathfinder), undertaken by experts over a period of years:
"Although the report was commissioned by this Office, the findings and recommendations are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister".
It would appear that the ODPM consider that the people who they themselves appointed to conduct the Pathfinder Trials were not sufficiently competent. Either that or, although Pathfinder was carried out by experts, they would prefer to base the future of the entire fire service upon the findings of a hastily convened committee of amateurs. Had the Review restricted itself to industrial relations and the pay dispute then Professor Bain would have been acting within his sphere of competence. However, this was not the case. The Review recommends far-reaching changes to proven, operational firefighting practice. These changes are not driven by technical imperative but to justify a reduction in the number of front¬line firefighters in order to effect a cost-neutral pay settlement.
One ODPM source tried to dismiss publication of Pathfinder as premature, even though it had lain dormant for more than two years. Mr Raynsford, the minister responsible for the fire service at the time, suggested that further analysis of Pathfinder carried out by the ODPM, showed that by using a different set of planning assumptions, the cost of the fire service could be cut by half without making much difference to current levels of loss of life and property. Such planning assumptions have not yet been made available to the public.
Employers and Government sources even tried to discredit Pathfinder (and justify their own plans to down-size the fire service) by repeating erroneous criticisms embedded in Bain.
"Pathfinder work was directed only to fire cover. The need is for an integrated risk-based policy including community fire safety and statutory fire safety measures". Bain Review 5.14
Such claims conflict with earlier, expert opinions.
11
"... (Pathfinder) considers how existing safety measures ( such as fire detection and protection systems, fire safety education and community fire safety measures ) will drive risk down." George Almond Jamooo
"The new methodology provides a national basis for planning the provision of Fire Service Emergency Cover....it provides... a cornerstone of an integrated approach to fire risk management....an evidence based method for assessing and responding to actual risk, taking into account the effect of fire safety measures." The Report of the CFBAC Fire Cover Review Task Group
It should also be considered that the FSEC methodology which followed on from Pathfinder and is now used to develop IRMP's cannot, of itself anticipate the outcomes of CFS. If that was a criticism of Pathfinder then it must equally apply to the current FSEC.
Pathfinder was an embarrassment to the Government.. In order to divert attention, the Government tried to portray the fire service as an incorrigibly backward institution, steeped in old ways of working and restrictive practices. What ministers failed to explain was how such an allegedly inflexible organization could be repeatedly identified as the top performing public service by the Audit Commission.
The Government kept the public debate simplistic, resorting to phrases such as 'modernisation' and 'people not buildings'.People were not encouraged to look too closely at what changes were to be involved in this process.
There was to be no major effort to sell the concept of risk-based fire cover. What the public was sold was an image of greedy and lazy firefighters betraying British troops at a time of impending hostilities in Iraq. What they were not asked was if they would be prepared to see their local fire station closed in order that the service to other people could be improved. What they were not asked was if they would feel safer if fewer firefighters were to attend if their house caught fire and would they mind if they took a little longer to arrive. These issues are fundamental to the Governments vision of a 'modern' fire service.
Perhaps the Government still considered the time to be premature' for public education. Certainly the Government implemented its 'reforms' without any meaningful public debate. Local fire authorities and senior fire officers were carried along by promises that they would be given the power to really manage and adapt their resources to suit their local needs.
4.2 Modernisation - Local Authorities
As a consequence of the firefighters dispute the Government were able to pave the way for their vision of a 'modern fire service' by repealing long-standing legislation which had prescribed national standards for emergency fire cover. Brigades were free to determine for themselves what speed of respon
12
weight of attack should apply within their own area. Yet, at the same time, the Government had stripped HM Fire Service Inspectorate of its role to carry out annual inspections of such standards at a time when it would have seemed reasonable, indeed prudent, to retain that role, if only for a transitional period..
The Government had also removed the need for fire authorities to seek ministerial approval for the impending changes. Under this new regime, each fire authority would produce an annual Integrated Risk Management Plan (IRMP) which would out-line proposed changes proposed for the coming year. It was to be the duty of each fire authority to consult the public and various stakeholders about such proposals. In the absence of nationally prescribed standards, this consultation process must be seen as fundamental in establishing a locally determined fire service. Yet many authorities have not promoted or pursued this process as vigorously as they have publicized other aspects of the modern fire service.
The general public know little of what is involved in the modernization program and few are aware of the consultation process. Many brigades seem happy to accept this situation and attribute it to apathy on the part of the general public.. IRMP's seem to be produced as a dialogue between professionals rather than to inform the layman.
(Some IRMP's) "read like internal documents with a section added about consultation. In no way can such plans encourage real and effective consultation with stakeholders" Peter Brierley Fire Engineers Journal Feb 2005
The extent to which some brigades have failed to engage in any robust consultation process was illustrated by one councilor's comments on resigning from the Tayside Fire Board in March 2005:
"7 con no longer serve on a board that does not wish to have the opinions of the
general public in Tayside."
Councillor Jennifer Speirs Lib Dem Arbroath
Councilor Speirs felt that there had not been sufficient public consultation over the proposed IRMP. It was revealed that less than a quarter of the planned 180.000 leaflets had been delivered to the public, and that there had been only 86 responses. Firemaster Stephen Hunter thought that approximately 40,000 leaflets had been delivered but he did not know to which areas. Even so, it was not considered to defer adoption of the IRMP to allow time to complete the consultation process.
When consultation does take place there is no guarantee that a fire authority will take account of public opinion. In 2004 Wiltshire Fire Brigade carried out a web-
13 based survey in which they asked:
Last year, 40% of the calls attended by Wiltshire Fire Brigade were unwanted or false alarm calls from, automatic fire alarm systems and telephone calls from the public. Do you that the Fire Brigade should always respond immediately to these calls?
Over 90% replied, "Yes, always respond immediately'.
In some circumstances, before sending firefighters to the scene, the Fire Brigade could ask people ivho report an automatic fire alarm sounding to check whether there is a fire in the building. Hoiv reasonable or unreasonable do you think this proposal would be?
Over 72% replied, "Very or fairly unreasonable'.
Yet in September 2004, Wiltshire Fire Brigade issued a statement that they were
tO adopt a "policy ofnon attendance in respect to fire signals generated from automatic fire detection systems unless there is a confirmed fire" (except in Certain
circumstances).
"Not everything that counts can be counted, and not everything that can be counted countsâ€.
Einstein
Einstein