The 'forgotten heroes' of the Grenfell Tower fire who have never been mentioned until now

[cactus jack]

And when you ask why they are covering up......
Ask why highrise attendance was reduced a few short years before.
Ask why this has never been discussed in the press.
Ask who was the mayor at the time. Ask who said that cuts would make London safer.
There are a lot more questions that should be asked of this individual arround the cuts to the LFB but that would be off topic.

Here's a little hint
[MEDIA=youtube]UN3e-aYUusc[/MEDIA]

[art]

I was happy to give my evidence at the Inquiry,I felt a sense of duty to all the victims that perished that night and wanted the truth to be told,warts and all.I know all my colleagues felt the same.
I wanted any shortcomings in the brigade response to be learned from, rectified and never be repeated.There were many things I learned at the Inquiry that had I known on the night would have changed some decisions I made ,and undoubtedly have reduced the death toll.
It was daunting being in the Inquiry room,there were rows of desks filled with around 100 lawyers and barristers facing you.
The lawyers and barristers would send their questions via computer to the main barrister asking the questions,it was hard not to feel like I was on trial.

[bill.advanced]

And when you ask why they are covering up......
Ask why highrise attendance was reduced a few short years before.
Ask why this has never been discussed in the press.
Ask who was the mayor at the time. Ask who said that cuts would make London safer.
There are a lot more questions that should be asked of this individual arround the cuts to the LFB but that would be off topic.

Here's a little hint
[MEDIA=youtube]UN3e-aYUusc[/MEDIA]

CJ yes and the liar supreme was not alone.
Certain chief officers stated that the cutbacks in manpower, stations, and manning would improve the service. How many times on here did we hear this from men who were ready to lie in order to convince the public that what they were doing was for their benefit.

[bill.advanced]

I was happy to give my evidence at the Inquiry,I felt a sense of duty to all the victims that perished that night and wanted the truth to be told,warts and all.I know all my colleagues felt the same.
I wanted any shortcomings in the brigade response to be learned from, rectified and never be repeated.There were many things I learned at the Inquiry that had I known on the night would have changed some decisions I made ,and undoubtedly have reduced the death toll.
It was daunting being in the Inquiry room,there were rows of desks filled with around 100 lawyers and barristers facing you.
The lawyers and barristers would send their questions via computer to the main barrister asking the questions,it was hard not to feel like I was on trial.

Art I worked in stations with multi stories in their areas for 16 years. I spent my last 14 years in a station which supported a station with multi storeys in their area.
Art many times I have ran through my mind what would we have done given the same set of circumstances that were presented that night at Grenfel.
Initially we would have responded the same.
As you know Art it’s important when attending multi storey fires that each and every crew member knows what they have to do. It’s also important that the residents know what they have to do.
I cannot comment on what happened after the initial response, and I have no doubt that lessons have been learnt. But what necessitated this learning. It was not necessitated through lack of training, or competence of the LFB but through a highly retardant building being turned into a tinder box through the greed and lack of due diligence by others, who had failed to maintain the fire protection standards that were necessary for our stay out policy to be effective. I have no doubts that mistakes were made, but given the circumstances I am not surprised. But the fact remains to use cricketing terms, you were bowled a googly.

The way I see this one side did their best in trying circumstances, whilst the other side including, politicians, contractors, and building control have much to answer for. You and your colleagues did your best, you were let down, but most importantly those who were let down the most were the residents. Yes Art learn from what happened, but don’t blame yourself for what happened. Finally art, hindsight is a wonderful thing, but hindsight is the ally of our detractors, and the enemy of people who did their best in extremely trying and self inflicted circumstances.
You and your mates have nothing but my admiration Art.

[ABee]

To be fair to Moore Bick (am I actually typing this?!!) his criticism of the LFB was mainly focussed on training and preparation from a managerial/strategic POV. I have read the entire first phase of the report and I have to agree with him on much of what he said

Its worth stressing that Moore Bick was clear that the crews on the ground worked bravely and he commended their efforts unequivocally. Sadly it was the media who spread a load of shit and misinformation

Some of his comments are entirely valid:

While front line crews were engaging in sticking smoke detectors up in homes where the owner was more than capable of doing so, other parts of the LFB knew the risks associated with cladding and did little with that information. They did pass the info to fire safety teams, who set up a training package for their staff, but this critical information was not passed to op crews. When you think of the fatal (FF fatality) Sun Valley fire in Herefordshire and countless other sandwich panel incidents , WTF didnt someone think that the guys at the squirty end should know about this risk?

But the biggest cock up perhaps nearly all of us are guilty of is he cultural misunderstanding of the term 'stay put'. Not just in the fire service, but across the fire safety industry, little consideration was given to what happens if fire conditions fail and stay put is not appropriate? Many of us had experienced this, including at Lakanhall in London a few years earlier. But there was no strategy, procedures or training.

This clearly resulted in a delay in abandoning stay put at Grenfell, despite with hindsight, it was obvious that stay put was untenable hours before it was formally rejected. I am not criticising anyone on the ground, but I am criticising managers for not adequately preparing plans and their staff for such a likelihood

As for Khan sacking Dany Cotton and then Cressida Dick. Some say he hates women, I couldn't possibly comment. But its clear he was involved in his own political firefighting to stop any blame reaching him by sacking Cotton. A cowardly act...... but then he is a politician

[bill.advanced]

To be fair to Moore Bick (am I actually typing this?!!) his criticism of the LFB was mainly focussed on training and preparation from a managerial/strategic POV. I have read the entire first phase of the report and I have to agree with him on much of what he said

Its worth stressing that Moore Bick was clear that the crews on the ground worked bravely and he commended their efforts unequivocally. Sadly it was the media who spread a load of shit and misinformation

Some of his comments are entirely valid:

While front line crews were engaging in sticking smoke detectors up in homes where the owner was more than capable of doing so, other parts of the LFB knew the risks associated with cladding and did little with that information. They did pass the info to fire safety teams, who set up a training package for their staff, but this critical information was not passed to op crews. When you think of the fatal (FF fatality) Sun Valley fire in Herefordshire and countless other sandwich panel incidents , WTF didnt someone think that the guys at the squirty end should know about this risk?

But the biggest cock up perhaps nearly all of us are guilty of is he cultural misunderstanding of the term 'stay put'. Not just in the fire service, but across the fire safety industry, little consideration was given to what happens if fire conditions fail and stay put is not appropriate? Many of us had experienced this, including at Lakanhall in London a few years earlier. But there was no strategy, procedures or training.

This clearly resulted in a delay in abandoning stay put at Grenfell, despite with hindsight, it was obvious that stay put was untenable hours before it was formally rejected. I am not criticising anyone on the ground, but I am criticising managers for not adequately preparing plans and their staff for such a likelihood

As for Khan sacking Dany Cotton and then Cressida Dick. Some say he hates women, I couldn't possibly comment. But its clear he was involved in his own political firefighting to stop any blame reaching him by sacking Cotton. A cowardly act...... but then he is a politician

When Moore Bick made his comments did he take into account the following points.

1) Multi storey buildings are not designed for mass evac.
2) How were the crews to communicate this information to the residents.
3) What provisions were in place for non ambulant residents.
4) Did the cutbacks create a lack of manpower and equipment.

Also I have been informed the the internal staircase of the building was filled with smoke at an early stage of the incident, was this the case, and if so did this not further exacerbate the situation. Also I feel it’s very important that there are clear defining lines here regarding stay put. It’s important that there is no confusion here. I feel now that due to such comments, and media coverage residents may now not follow the stay put policy which has saved many lives throughout the decades. Can you imagine the situation where crews turn up only to find their route to the fire is blocked by residents trying to flee the building due to such comments and media coverage. These clear lines, are now vague in the minds of some residents, and this situation could easily lead to a scenario similar to what happened at Grenfel.

[art]

Abee is spot on
"But the biggest cock up perhaps nearly all of us are guilty of is he cultural misunderstanding of the term 'stay put'. Not just in the fire service, but across the fire safety industry, little consideration was given to what happens if fire conditions fail and stay put is not appropriate? Many of us had experienced this, including at Lakanhall in London a few years"
I didn't attend the Lakanal House fire but I read everything from Coroners Inquiry into that,especially around stay put policy.
At the time of the Grenfell fire I believe many officers did not feel comfortable about when was the correct time to abandon stay put.
I believe some people felt that by sticking to stay put, they would be protected from liability, if people died after the policy was abandoned.
If you followed the Grenfell Inquiry you would find that I advocated to abandon stay put more than 1 hour before it was officially abandoned.I distinctly remember at the time that no dead casualties had yet been found.
My non- scientific best hope was that we might be lucky and suffer as few as a dozen casualties,the flip side of that same coin went through my head that we might suffer 200 deaths,some of which would be fireghters.
The truth is that there were no easy options on the night,everybody did their best in a situation not of our making.
My criticism of the Brigade revolves around preparedness and lack of training in the years prior to Grenfell.
Put into context against the organisations that carry the real guilt,such as the Government for allowing the use of highly combustible cladding and the companies that KNOWINGLY promoted their sale,I know the Brigade holds little responsibility.

[ABee]

When Moore Bick made his comments did he take into account the following points.

1) Multi storey buildings are not designed for mass evac.
2) How were the crews to communicate this information to the residents.
3) What provisions were in place for non ambulant residents.
4) Did the cutbacks create a lack of manpower and equipment.

Also I have been informed the the internal staircase of the building was filled with smoke at an early stage of the incident, was this the case, and if so did this not further exacerbate the situation. Also I feel it’s very important that there are clear defining lines here regarding stay put. It’s important that there is no confusion here. I feel now that due to such comments, and media coverage residents may now not follow the stay put policy which has saved many lives throughout the decades. Can you imagine the situation where crews turn up only to find their route to the fire is blocked by residents trying to flee the building due to such comments and media coverage. These clear lines, are now vague in the minds of some residents, and this situation could easily lead to a scenario similar to what happened at Grenfel.

Yes, of course he was aware of all of the matters in your list

As far as the automatic opening ventilation (AOV) at Grenfell is concerned, there are lots of half truths being spread.

It was recently updated, but a previous version was in in place in the 1980s. Grenfell was on my patch and we had quite a few jobs there. We were aware of the smoke detection on landings as the plastic coated cages were all burnt by yobs bring to set of the fire alarm. Wewere never informed it was there to operate the AOV, or how to manually override the system to open the AOV. Let's be fair, we never did 1(i)(d)s to tower blocks, so how would we know?

There are plenty of apocryphal tales that the AOV 'failed' on the night of the Grenfell fire, especially in the gutter press, and therefore repeated on social media. Like all smoke control systems, the AOV and smoke control system at Grenfell would be designed to expel an expected amount of smoke for a given time. At Grenfell, that quantity would probably be based on a flat alight with a fire door wedged open to the stairs. That amount of smoke and heat would have been easily exceeded - perhaps in the first 60 mins when multiple flats and cladding was alight. Plus, rescues were still ongoing 6 hours or more after the time of call.

No ventilation system could cope with that! To say the AOV failed, it to say your Vauxhall Nova failed when it couldn't handle 150 bags of cement!!!

You're are right Bill, getting people to stay put is really difficult now. I have worked on a building holding 6,000 people. It is fitted with phased evacuation where a voice alarm tells people there's a fire that's being investigated, and not to take any action. Nobody is taking any notice now and crowding onto staircases that are designed for 3 floors at a time.

And hospital staff are increasingly uneasy about 'progressive horizontal evacuation' - where patients are moved laterally away from a fire to another fire compartment and wait there for the job to be dealt with. It is so difficult to reassure staff its OK and a safe system of work, when they've been confronted by Grenfell and 9/11 images

[bill.advanced]

Yes, of course he was aware of all of the matters in your list

As far as the automatic opening ventilation (AOV) at Grenfell is concerned, there are lots of half truths being spread.

It was recently updated, but a previous version was in in place in the 1980s. Grenfell was on my patch and we had quite a few jobs there. We were aware of the smoke detection on landings as the plastic coated cages were all burnt by yobs bring to set of the fire alarm. Wewere never informed it was there to operate the AOV, or how to manually override the system to open the AOV. Let's be fair, we never did 1(i)(d)s to tower blocks, so how would we know?

There are plenty of apocryphal tales that the AOV 'failed' on the night of the Grenfell fire, especially in the gutter press, and therefore repeated on social media. Like all smoke control systems, the AOV and smoke control system at Grenfell would be designed to expel an expected amount of smoke for a given time. At Grenfell, that quantity would probably be based on a flat alight with a fire door wedged open to the stairs. That amount of smoke and heat would have been easily exceeded - perhaps in the first 60 mins when multiple flats and cladding was alight. Plus, rescues were still ongoing 6 hours or more after the time of call.

No ventilation system could cope with that! To say the AOV failed, it to say your Vauxhall Nova failed when it couldn't handle 150 bags of cement!!!

You're are right Bill, getting people to stay put is really difficult now. I have worked on a building holding 6,000 people. It is fitted with phased evacuation where a voice alarm tells people there's a fire that's being investigated, and not to take any action. Nobody is taking any notice now and crowding onto staircases that are designed for 3 floors at a time.

And hospital staff are increasingly uneasy about 'progressive horizontal evacuation' - where patients are moved laterally away from a fire to another fire compartment and wait there for the job to be dealt with. It is so difficult to reassure staff its OK and a safe system of work, when they've been confronted by Grenfell and 9/11 images

Many thanks Abee, you have been very helpful on this subject. I have certainly learnt a few things from you.
But my opinion as to is primarily to blame for what happened will never change.
And I will never fully respect this report because of how it was carried out.
But again thanks for your excellent input.

[Nightstaffer]

Now that the enquiry as concluded consideration is being given to bringing criminal charges

if justice is being delivered at last then it must be delivered swiftly

As one member of the Grenfell community said ( I paraphrase)
“ past experience with Aberfan, Hillsborough and other disasters tells us that it could take a very long time before we get justice”