04-29-2007, 09:22 AM
It would appear that some brigades have tried to influence the public perception of fire risks by restricting the flow of information via the media. The Fire Service has traditionally been the most open & transparent of all the public services but over recent years that has changed dramatically. Although some brigades have taken advantage of modern technology to enhance the delivery of media information, they are in the minority. Their efforts serve only to highlight the shortcomings of other brigades.
For whatever reason, some brigades are consistently failing short of these standards. On one occasion, one metropolitan brigade went over an entire week¬end claiming that there had been nothing 'newsworthy' to report. On the Monday morning, the only incident considered 'newsworthy' was the rescue of a dog from a canal. There had in fact been numerous fires over the week-end including a serious arson attack and a house fire where the family had been saved as a result of action by firefighters. Another brigade stated that there had been 'no incidents of note1 when there had been a severe house fire where firefighters had rescued a mother and her three young children. On yet another occasion, a fire on the eleventh floor of a sixteen storey block of flats had required the prolonged attendance of ten firefighting appliances overnight. Again, there was no mention of this on the press tape: just the routine 'nothing of interest' statement. The same brigade omitted to mention an incident where ten appliances attended a factory which was destroyed by fire and explosion, causing damage amounting to over £500,000 and costing several jobs. Such incidents are not isolated.
Ultimately, it is not the media that is being misled but the general public. If people are to make a reasoned response when consulted about IRMP proposals then they should be fully aware of all possible, relevant information. By choosing to dismiss certain incidents as being of no interest, press officers could be seen as attempting to influence the democratic process.
14
It is these very incidents, which some press officers choose to dismiss as 'not newsworthy', that can be so important in the drive to save lives. The emphasis on Community Fire Safety is undoubtedly one of the most positive aspects of the modern Fire Service. Yet news about large fires in offices or factories will often serve little useful purpose other than to satisfy our morbid curiosity. It is the 'little' stories that can often help to save lives. Articles about how a local family nearly lost their lives because they had not fitted a smoke alarm, or about the house in the next street that was damaged by smoke when a chip-pan was left unattended
It is these less 'newsworthy' incidents that can have the greatest influence in helping to reduce fire-related deaths and damage, incidents with which ordinary members of the public can readily identify. Yet while Press Officers will actively engage with the media in promoting their own CFS initiatives, they do not display the same willingness to publicise fire-related incidents.
This trend has now become quite blatant. It would seem that despite paying lip-service to the idea of 'public consultation' many Brigades are, in practice, guided by a warning issued by the former Fire Minister:
"Make no mistake. Whether through a negotiated settlement or through the Bill, and the imminent White Paper, the Fire Service will reform and modernise. No-one will have a veto on the modernization process." Nick Raynsford MP Address to the CACFOA annual conference
15 5.1 The Alternative Agenda
At the end of 1999, the Home Secretary set up an independent inquiry to look at the procedures for determining firefighters conditions of service. This came about as a direct result of a request from the Local Government Authorities (LGA) after they had failed to impose radical changes through the existing negotiating machinery. The Inquiry, led by Professor Frank Burchill, quickly established that relations between firefighters and the Employers had become increasingly prone to conflict due to
"...unrelentingpressure by successive governments to secure cost reductions...." Report of the Inquiry Into the Machinery for Determining Firefighters Conditions of Service 5.3
The Report warned that over the past decades, Fire Authorities, in response to budgetary constraints, had been
".....pre-occupied with the removal of fire stations and appliances."
Report of the Inquiry Into the Machinery for Determining Firefighters Conditions of
Service 5.4
Proposals by fire authorities for re-organisation within the brigades had led to the loss of 1500 jobs between 1997 and 1999. Consequently, many brigades were already operating at the bare minimum level of fire cover required under the Fire Services Act 1947.
"Local authorities have struggled to maintain the high standards set by the NFS after
1947"-
'Our fire & rescue service': a local, regional or national responsibility? Dr Shane
Ewen 2004
Under the Governments Best Value program, fire authorities were under more pressure to reduce costs than most other public sectors. The Governments own Audit Commission had consistently scored the Fire Service as the top performing public service. With little scope to improve further on performance targets the only alternative was to reduce costs. In a sector where wages account for more than 85% of the total budget, this inevitably implied further job losses.
Under what the Government described as the 'old, prescriptive system', national standards in respect of speed of response and weight of attack determined the disposition of resources. The 1947 Act did not preclude any change in the disposition of these resources, so long asit was still possible to meet the national minimum standards. Section 19 of the 1947 Act also required that any such changes were to be subject to ministerial approval.
This was the problem.
Many brigades were at, or close to the point where they could not make any further cuts and still maintain those standards. Subsequently, brigades would fail the annual assessment by HM Fire Service Inspectorate. As these cuts had to receive ministerial approval, it was the Government that would be seen to be reducing levels of public safety.
Clearly, this would have been politically unacceptable.
However, throughout the 1990's, senior fire officers had been developing a new system of fire cover based on the risk to life rather than property. The Pathfinder Trials had been established in order to test the theory against specific, operational data. It was argued that such a system would require a new degree of flexibility which might justify a move away from nationally prescribed standards and the abolition of Section 19 of the 1947 Act. Yet even before the Trials were complete, it was becoming apparent that the results might indicate the need for a significant increase in the level of resources employed.. Soon afterwards the Pathfinder Trials were ended prematurely.
Although there can be no doubt that the development of risk-based assessment was aimed at saving lives, there were also financial expectations.
"Whilst the new approach does not seek savings overall, we would expect to remove
actual over-provision...."
George Almond Fire Engineers Journal January 2000
Mr. Almond goes on to say of Pathfinder:
"These views will now provide the initial (and possibly only) assessment of the operational implications of implementing the new system, rather than the operational trials originally planned".
This statement confirms that the Pathfinder Trials had been aborted yet it also seems to imply that the system was still to be implemented.
In November 2000, the minutes of the Budget Committee for the Greater London Assembly state that the Fire Authority was
"...investigating the way in which stations were staffed in the context of possible changes in the way in which 'fire risk' was to be assessed".
It is interesting that even after Pathfinder had been 'discredited' and long before the Bain Review, two of Britain's most senior fire officers still seemed to believe that the introduction of a system of risk-based assessment was imminent.
For whatever reason, some brigades are consistently failing short of these standards. On one occasion, one metropolitan brigade went over an entire week¬end claiming that there had been nothing 'newsworthy' to report. On the Monday morning, the only incident considered 'newsworthy' was the rescue of a dog from a canal. There had in fact been numerous fires over the week-end including a serious arson attack and a house fire where the family had been saved as a result of action by firefighters. Another brigade stated that there had been 'no incidents of note1 when there had been a severe house fire where firefighters had rescued a mother and her three young children. On yet another occasion, a fire on the eleventh floor of a sixteen storey block of flats had required the prolonged attendance of ten firefighting appliances overnight. Again, there was no mention of this on the press tape: just the routine 'nothing of interest' statement. The same brigade omitted to mention an incident where ten appliances attended a factory which was destroyed by fire and explosion, causing damage amounting to over £500,000 and costing several jobs. Such incidents are not isolated.
Ultimately, it is not the media that is being misled but the general public. If people are to make a reasoned response when consulted about IRMP proposals then they should be fully aware of all possible, relevant information. By choosing to dismiss certain incidents as being of no interest, press officers could be seen as attempting to influence the democratic process.
14
It is these very incidents, which some press officers choose to dismiss as 'not newsworthy', that can be so important in the drive to save lives. The emphasis on Community Fire Safety is undoubtedly one of the most positive aspects of the modern Fire Service. Yet news about large fires in offices or factories will often serve little useful purpose other than to satisfy our morbid curiosity. It is the 'little' stories that can often help to save lives. Articles about how a local family nearly lost their lives because they had not fitted a smoke alarm, or about the house in the next street that was damaged by smoke when a chip-pan was left unattended
It is these less 'newsworthy' incidents that can have the greatest influence in helping to reduce fire-related deaths and damage, incidents with which ordinary members of the public can readily identify. Yet while Press Officers will actively engage with the media in promoting their own CFS initiatives, they do not display the same willingness to publicise fire-related incidents.
This trend has now become quite blatant. It would seem that despite paying lip-service to the idea of 'public consultation' many Brigades are, in practice, guided by a warning issued by the former Fire Minister:
"Make no mistake. Whether through a negotiated settlement or through the Bill, and the imminent White Paper, the Fire Service will reform and modernise. No-one will have a veto on the modernization process." Nick Raynsford MP Address to the CACFOA annual conference
15 5.1 The Alternative Agenda
At the end of 1999, the Home Secretary set up an independent inquiry to look at the procedures for determining firefighters conditions of service. This came about as a direct result of a request from the Local Government Authorities (LGA) after they had failed to impose radical changes through the existing negotiating machinery. The Inquiry, led by Professor Frank Burchill, quickly established that relations between firefighters and the Employers had become increasingly prone to conflict due to
"...unrelentingpressure by successive governments to secure cost reductions...." Report of the Inquiry Into the Machinery for Determining Firefighters Conditions of Service 5.3
The Report warned that over the past decades, Fire Authorities, in response to budgetary constraints, had been
".....pre-occupied with the removal of fire stations and appliances."
Report of the Inquiry Into the Machinery for Determining Firefighters Conditions of
Service 5.4
Proposals by fire authorities for re-organisation within the brigades had led to the loss of 1500 jobs between 1997 and 1999. Consequently, many brigades were already operating at the bare minimum level of fire cover required under the Fire Services Act 1947.
"Local authorities have struggled to maintain the high standards set by the NFS after
1947"-
'Our fire & rescue service': a local, regional or national responsibility? Dr Shane
Ewen 2004
Under the Governments Best Value program, fire authorities were under more pressure to reduce costs than most other public sectors. The Governments own Audit Commission had consistently scored the Fire Service as the top performing public service. With little scope to improve further on performance targets the only alternative was to reduce costs. In a sector where wages account for more than 85% of the total budget, this inevitably implied further job losses.
Under what the Government described as the 'old, prescriptive system', national standards in respect of speed of response and weight of attack determined the disposition of resources. The 1947 Act did not preclude any change in the disposition of these resources, so long asit was still possible to meet the national minimum standards. Section 19 of the 1947 Act also required that any such changes were to be subject to ministerial approval.
This was the problem.
Many brigades were at, or close to the point where they could not make any further cuts and still maintain those standards. Subsequently, brigades would fail the annual assessment by HM Fire Service Inspectorate. As these cuts had to receive ministerial approval, it was the Government that would be seen to be reducing levels of public safety.
Clearly, this would have been politically unacceptable.
However, throughout the 1990's, senior fire officers had been developing a new system of fire cover based on the risk to life rather than property. The Pathfinder Trials had been established in order to test the theory against specific, operational data. It was argued that such a system would require a new degree of flexibility which might justify a move away from nationally prescribed standards and the abolition of Section 19 of the 1947 Act. Yet even before the Trials were complete, it was becoming apparent that the results might indicate the need for a significant increase in the level of resources employed.. Soon afterwards the Pathfinder Trials were ended prematurely.
Although there can be no doubt that the development of risk-based assessment was aimed at saving lives, there were also financial expectations.
"Whilst the new approach does not seek savings overall, we would expect to remove
actual over-provision...."
George Almond Fire Engineers Journal January 2000
Mr. Almond goes on to say of Pathfinder:
"These views will now provide the initial (and possibly only) assessment of the operational implications of implementing the new system, rather than the operational trials originally planned".
This statement confirms that the Pathfinder Trials had been aborted yet it also seems to imply that the system was still to be implemented.
In November 2000, the minutes of the Budget Committee for the Greater London Assembly state that the Fire Authority was
"...investigating the way in which stations were staffed in the context of possible changes in the way in which 'fire risk' was to be assessed".
It is interesting that even after Pathfinder had been 'discredited' and long before the Bain Review, two of Britain's most senior fire officers still seemed to believe that the introduction of a system of risk-based assessment was imminent.
"Not everything that counts can be counted, and not everything that can be counted countsâ€.
Einstein
Einstein